The complexity of amental disorder such as depression is such that away of interlinking the neural, mental and interpersonal levels is needed. This paper proposes that at heoretical framework which distinguishes, and relates, macro-theory and micro-theory at these levels can serve this purpose. The 'Interacting Cognitive Subsystems' approach to mental architecture is used to show how, via the detailed specification of mental processes and representations, am acro-theory of mental architecture contributes to our understanding of depressed states. In the account advanced by Teasdale and Barnard depressed states are seen as being maintained by an abnormal version of ad ynamic dialogue between two qualitatively distinct types of meaning: one is referentially specific, propositional meaning, the other consists of holistic schemata rich in latent content and is called implicational meaning. In depressed states with ruminative and avoidant thought patterns, the mental function of attention is seen as being directed preferentially at propositional meanings. There is ac orresponding neglect of attention to implicational meanings. The paper concludes with abrief discussion of how this approach can address transdiagnostic issues and how it may suggest new strategies for therapeutic interventions.
Introduction
As the contributors to this edition have shown, research across disciplines has provided us with agreat deal of information about depressedstates.The effectsof depressive disorder are clearly systemic at multiple levels of analysisrelating to brain, mind and interpersonal functioning. However, depressedstates of mind are also commonly found in other disorders. There is, therefore, aneed to develop a 'transdiagnostic'theory which can give an account of depressive disorders as such, plus an understanding of why symptoms commonly overlap across diagnoses (Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, &S hafran, 2008) . Ideally, the same overall theory should also be capable of explaining the features of othermajor mental disorders.
There is an inevitable tension between wanting 'simple' theories and the complex,s ystem-wide ramifications of depression that require us to take into account manyd ifferent facets of mental and social life. While the various theoretical perspectives that seek to account for depression are distinct in one way or another, they are often saying rather similar things while using different frames of reference and vocabularies -i nwaysthat invite both comparison and charged intellectual debates. Their languages also vary in their formality, expressiveness and testability. This paper offers one 'cognitive'perspective on the complexity of the normal human mind and its application to depression. It is grounded in humaninformation processing theory and therefore is couchedinmore'technical'language than most clinicians will be familiar with. It illustratest he potential valueo fs ystem-level analysis in making possibleamacro-theory of mental architecture which might complement otherunderstandings of depression. Without a'macro-theory' we are left only with micro-theories concerning specific mental capabilities and the hypothesesoflimited scope which they are able to generate.
Systems: Macro-theory and micro-theory Figure 1i llustrates three systems at the different levels of neural, mental and behavioural architecture.E ach is represented as ah ierarchy where the system overall (A) is first decomposed intobasic interacting units (Bs). These are further decomposed into constituents (Cs). The basicunits for the neural architecture (left of figure) might represent large-scale interacting neural circuits such as the limbic system and frontal cortex. Each of thesecan be divided into smaller units such as nuclei and local cortical regions interacting within thosecircuits. Theoperations of this system that need to be explained are electro-chemical. In respect of the 'behavioural' architecture (right of the figure) the basicunits (Bs) are individual humans and the entities with which they interact in their physical environment Figure 1 . Three system levels: Relating neural architecture, mental architecture and behavioural architecture. and social worlds.H ere the 'system' consistso fs hifting assemblies of basic 'units' coming togetherindifferent and frequently changing contexts(e.g. family home, work,socializing).The behaviour of this system relates to human actions in the world, including vocal and gestural communication. Between neurala nd behavioural architecture is mental architecture.T he behaviour of mental architecture can be thought of in terms of how 'information' is represented, stored and used by mental processesr ather than in terms of physical processesi nt he brain or actions in the world. The basicu nits in mental architecture are thus subsystems of mind. Their constituents are mental processes.
Af ull account of complexc onditionss uch as depression would require a complete theory for all of these systems and of how their operation depends one upon another. Figure1alsoindicates what is requiredfor acomplete account. We would need theories for the workings of specific mental competencies such as language, thought, memory, attention and emotion. In this scheme, these are called micro-theories.Inaddition, we require amacro-theory of how thesebasic components workt ogether within the mind as aw hole. The sameg eneral approach canb ea pplied to then eural andb ehavioural architectures. The horizontal arrows betweent he systems indicate in part,f or instance, that the behaviour of mental architecture will be constrained by the neural architecture that implements it, and in part will be determined by the owner of that architecture having learnt about the regularities encountered in the behavioural systemswithin which they have participated.
Knowing that ap articulars ystem is composed of hierarchically organized 'units' says little about the way those parts actually behave.Eventually, we need to be able to specify how asystem is configured, whatthe capabilities of the units are, what requirements need to be met for them to use their capability and howt he operation of awhole system is dynamically controlled and co-ordinated (Barnard, May, Duke, &D uce, 2000) . However, we already know that depression affects cognitive, affective and somatic features of mental life and am acro-theory of mental architecture of this kind offers aviable way of confronting the complexities of this condition, and possiblyofothers that may be closely allied with it. It also provides akey conceptualbridge between neuraland behavioural systems.
'Basic mammal' architecture
To give ac learer idea of an approach which is likelyt ob eu nfamiliar to most clinicians, Iw ill describea na rchitecture of as ort that might be sufficient for a 'basic mammal', such as arat. This basicmammalian plan will then be developed to characterize whatisn eededfor the human.
Figure2shows ap lan of mental architecture in mucht he same format as might be used to specify the architecture of ac omputer system.T here are four subsystems, the postulated 'basic units' (Bs in Figure1): VISUAL for processing sights, ACOUSTICf or sounds, BODY STATE for bodily information and MULTIMODAL for integrating the products of the three sensory subsystems and handling the regularities occurring in cross-modale xperiences. Their 'inputs' from sense receptors and 'outputs' to bodily effectors (head, eyes, limbs,somatic and visceral, etc.) are alsoshown. Thearrows show patterns of information flow.
Each subsystemh as three kinds of 'constituents' (Cs in Figure 1 ), with defined capabilities: am emory, an image and processes. Them emorye xtracts and preservesregularitiesofexperience (what has been found to go with what in each of the four domains). The image holds atrace of recent input. The content of sensory images would be equivalent to whatwehumans consciously experience as states and dynamics within the current sights and sounds 'out there in the world', as well as to physical feelings in our bodies. The image of the multimodal subsystem represents an abstracts ynthesiso fu nderlying commonalities among these inputs (the 'invariants'). It captures holistic feelings which may be marked by positive or negativee motions. In our more advanced architecture, such an image might consist of asense of unease or of positive anticipation about some forthcoming event. In common with other approaches, emotions are regarded as information (e.g. Schwarz &C lore,1983 ) and evolved to guide the adaptive selection of actions (e.g. Tooby &C osmides, 2000) .
Whereas the memoryc omponentso ft he sensory subsystems would support what is often referred to as perceptual learning, the memory system of the multi-modals ubsystem would supportc lassical and instrumental conditioning. It would do this via extracting and preserving the co-occurrence of content derived from the sensory subsystems along with positive and negative affective markers. Each subsystem also containsprocesses to create images that we can be aware of (indexed by horizontal dark grey rectangles) or to transform information for onward transmission to another subsystemoraneffector (the lighter grey dumbbell shapes). Taken together, the components and flow patterns specify how this 'basic mammal' mind couldbeconfigured. It also provides aframework in which we can add more detail, or micro-theory, concerning the precise capabilitieso f each component as well as whati sn eededf or that capability to be used in a particularway (for afuller account see Barnard, 1985; Teasdale &Barnard,1993) .
To closet his section there is ak ey concept that will be used later in my discussion of the processing of meaning in depresseds tates. This concerns attentiont oi nformation in the minda nd focal awareness. Figure 2s hows attentiona satriangle, in this case connecting the content of the multi-modal image to the information flow to the effectors.B ecausea ni mage is at race of recent input with temporal extent, actions can then be selected more robustly on the basis of a' bigger' patterno fl ongerd uration than would otherwise be possible. Within this theoretical approach, attention is focused to select part of an image which then controls and co-ordinates the outwardfl ow of information. While the content of the images in other subsystems contributes to aw ider and diffuse sense of phenomenological awareness, the locuso ft his attentional mechanism indexes whatt ype of information is in focal awareness. Just as one might put the spotlight of attention on ap articular part of av isual scene,t his theory argues that, at any one moment in time, attention can be directed at only one type of image and somepart of the wider pattern of information it contains.
Attention can move around the mental landscapeinmuch the same way as we might look over av isual landscape. Were the triangular shape in the diagram positioned over one of the three sensory images it would indicate that some aspect of visual, acoustic or bodily information was in focal awareness -a swhen we focus our attention on part of av isual scene, aq uality of ag iven sound or sensations in one part of our bodies rather than another.
Af our-subsystem architecture of this kind could well be enough to theorize about the behaviour and learning capabilities of most mammals. Forinstance, in this four-subsystem configuration, if we consider that the multi-modal subsystem assigns affective significance to information states, the owner of such an architecture might well be able to show behaviour such as submission in response to athreat from another memberofthe samespecies. However, it wouldbehard to accommodate the full range of human mental capabilities, or the meanings that humans experience in depressedstates.Wealso have extraordinary limb control, manual dexterity and intricate vocal articulation. We are capable of imagining sounds and scenesa sw ell as having thought, language and beliefs about ourselves, others and about states of the world. Moreover, if we assume that any one of the processesthat transformsinformation is only able to do one thing at a time (Barnard, 1985) , the 'basic mammal' architecture would be limited to the control of action in the here and now augmented only by rather straightforward pattern completion from the four memorycomponents. In contrast, we are able to walk, talk, think and manipulate objects at the same time. There are simplyn ot enough basicunits in Figure2to supportall that concurrent activity.
An ine subsystems mental architecture sufficient for human-level ideation and mental experience Figure 3s howst wo extra 'effector' subsystems: EFFECTORt oc ontrol limb movements and ARTICULATORY for vocal articulation. We now have four central subsystems with reciprocal flows of informationa mong them: MORPHONOLEXICAL which is specialized to handle information in verbal representation form (required for language processing and verbalm ental imagery), SPATIAL-PRAXIC for spatial representations (control of intentional action in the world and visuo-spatial mental imagery) as well as the original ACOUSTIC, VISUAL and BODY-STATE subsystems of the basic plan. The single MULTI-MODALs ubsystemi sn ow split into twos ubsystems: 'PROPOSITIONAL' and 'IMPLICATIONAL,' each specialized to handle qualitatively distinct forms of meaning.
Acase can be madeonempirical groundsfor this particularmacro-theory of human mental architecture and its two levels of meaning( Teasdale&Barnard, Figure 3 . The full nine-subsystem architecture proposed by Teasdale and Barnard (1993) as abasis for developing an account of depression. 1993). Furthermore, evolutionary considerations dovetail neatly with this model. The evolutionary idea is that additional subsystems evolved in aseries of discrete steps out of an originalm ammalian multi-modal subsystem. New subsystems emerge somewhat in the way that cells divide in biology. At each step, the original multi-modalsubsystem of Figure 2splitsinto two, forming adaughter subsystem with some newmental functionality (Barnard, Duke, Byrne, &Davidson, 2007) .
Ab rief narrative can help us to understand how, according to this theory, meaningsare represented and processed in the minds of modern humans. Barnard et al. (2007) conjectured that aspecies of monkey with already advanced manual and limb dexterity might have evolved an effector subsystem specialized for the control of its limbs and hands. Once in place, the animal's multi-modal subsystemwas able to capitalize on the deep structure of what was common to the control of movement and the contemporaneous changes in the visual world. For instance, the parameters for moving muscles and the feedback from vision would both reflect something akin to 'rotation' in space.E ventually, thesed eeper invariantsw ould be sufficientt of orm an independent mental representation, or 'code'. When the neuraln etworkss pecialized for processing the code separate from other circuitry this would be the emergence of the spatial-praxic subsystem. This would supportour ability to create and modify 'visuo-spatial' mental images abstractly -e ntirely 'in the mind'.
Thes amer easoning can be applied to thed evelopment of verbal communication and meaning-o ur ability to manipulate underlying structures in verbalc ommunication, both in the form of utterances and as thought. Asubsystem controlling vocal articulation would lead on to an ability to handle what speech motor articulation and hearing have in common, namely the invariants of phonology (morphonolexical).
Our brief sketch of apossible evolutionarytrajectory has now reached eight subsystems. At this stage there is still only asingle multi-modalsubsystem. This is assigning affective significance, but now to internally generated verbal and visuo-spatial content and imageryaswell as to images of whatisactually seen or heard. It is reasonable to suppose that our ancestors with this hypotheticaleightsubsystemarchitecture would have been talking about events, actions, agents and their concretep roperties as well as perhaps accompanying verbalizations with communicative gesturessuch as pointing (Noble &Davidson, 1996) .
We conceive of the ninth subsystem as emerging out of the memory of the single multi-modals ubsystem of the eight-subsystem architecture. Thei dea is that it acts as acrucible of whatwill become propositional meaning (Welshon, in press ); namely,t he invariantss hared by spatial-praxic and morphonolexical content. Through extracting and 'modelling'the underlyingp atterns and events in the world and the mind, propositional meaning -m aking references to specific objects, agents, eventsa nd their properties -b ecomes as eparated omain of encoding.
This architecture specifies three reciprocal loops capable of supporting concurrent control and co-ordination of language, intentional actions and semantic ideation. Thec entral loop betweenp ropositional and implicational meaning is configured so that attention is linked to propositional rather than implicational meaning.The architecture is then able to makepropositional meanings the focus of attention in conceptual thought, while implicational meaning generates propositions outside focal awareness. Whereas af our-subsystem architecture could only attend to one central representation, this nine-subsystem architecture allows for attention to be movedaround four types of central mental representation. This framework of macro-theory, and the differentiation of subsystems just outlined, reinforces the case we have advanced elsewhere for the existence of two forms of meaning. It is also, we believe,amental architecture whoseconfiguration renders it vulnerable to depression (Teasdale &Barnard, 1993) .
Propositional and implicational meanings
The logic of the argument entails that the new form of propositionalm eaning, while referentially specific, lacks emotional charge. The emotional markers remain in the residualm ulti-modals ubsystem( now re-named as implicational meaning). This retains itsinputs from body states, visual and auditoryprocessing as well as its direct control of visceraland somatic outputs. It follows from this model that we can use implicational meanings to generate referentially specific propositions about different emotions without necessarily experiencing them.
With the emergence of af unctionally independentp ropositional subsystem, then ature of implicationalm eaningsf undamentallyc hanges.T he new independent memorycomponent of the propositional subsystem is in ap osition to worko ut what related propositions have in common and to pass these as 'summaries'tothe implicational subsystem. This, in turn, is positioned to work out deeper, more abstractand holistic relationships,and to link these to affective states. Teasdale and Barnard (1993) describeimplicational meanings as capturing holistic schematic models of the self, the world and others. These equate with what we think of as senses, feelings, intuitions or wisdom relating to some domain. It encapsulates latent rather than explicit meanings. Of course, there are other views concerning latent meaning, notably within psychoanalytic theory. The position advocated here aims to be precise about how latent meaningi s encoded and processed. However, while Figure 3might appear 'mechanistic', its format is intended to depict the capacities neededt os upportr ational reflective thought, affect and latent meaning in humani deation.
Latent meaningw ithin the implicational subsystem blends the products of immediate perception of the externalw orld with embodiede xperience and conceptualthought. Arepresentationofthe current overall existential state of the self, in the body in aphysical and/or social context, can be synthesized, while the memory component 'models' regularities in the co-occurrenceso fa ttributes in this mental code. The nine-subsystem variant is configured to represent our capacities to grasp, propositionally represent and reflect upon abstractg eneric concepts such as 'success'and 'failure', 'personaladequacy' and how situations might 'otherwise be'. We proposethat abstract conceptualcontent of thiskind is now attached with the markersofdifferent emotions rather than these beingfixed to specific propositions, visual images in the mind or words in phrases.
The resulting schematic models, encodeda st hese implicational meanings, define and constrain the mind's capabilities for generating the internal cognitions that underpin both normal and dysfunctional ideation. Any givent rajectory of ideation is viewed as driven by adialogue betweenthe two levels of meanings: abstract schematicm odels give rise to specific propositions; patterns in these propositions feed back to sustain, update or modify the current schematic model projected into the 'image' of the implicational subsystem. Teasdale and Barnard termed this 'the Central Engine of Ideation'. There is no homunculus or 'Central Executive' in this. Computer scientists term it distributed rather than centralized control. Thec onfiguration is controlleda nd co-ordinated via the dynamic system-wide patterns of information flow. All subsystems do exactly the same type of thing but use different types of 'code'. This architecture has enough resourcesto enable the central engine to function while at the sametime the different output processesa re generating verbalo utputa nd/or generating material for the intentional control of action.
Dysfunctional cognitions anda ffective states arising out of system level interactions
The specification Ih ave set out allows us to probe how the mind might behave were the capabilities of its componentstobecompromised in one way or another. This mightbeasaconsequence of aproblem with underlying neural architecture, ap roblem with learning from experiences in one or more behavioural architectures, or where the co-ordination of components is disrupted in mental architecture.
Depression as av ulnerability to 'interlocked' processing in the central engine
Using the Interactive Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) model, Teasdale and Barnard (1993) hypothesized that in major depression there is ap redispositionf or the central engine to enteran'interlocked' state in which dysfunctionalimplicational self-models are regenerated in repeated cycles. The central engine, with its reciprocal dialogue betweenp ropositional meanings, can be regarded as a 'control' loop. Like any control system, it may malfunction. Under some circumstances control loops are prone to become'stuck' in anegative feedback; in other circumstances a' runaway' positive feedback may arise. Manic states have been linked to the central engine entering ap ositive, runaway and unchecked state of this kind (Barnard, 2004) .
In states of depression, the products of propositional processing, framed around narrow themes, feed back to the implicational subsystemand essentially perpetuate the same generic information state. This leads to the generation of yet more propositional materialw ithv ery similar content.T he macro-theoretical frameworkallows us to speculate about the requirements which are mostlikelyto reinforce and maintain this interlock.M ulti-modal perceptual cues from the external world (perhaps the individual beinginthe sameplace and doing little), along with markerso fl owered bodilye nergy, by continually feeding into the implicational subsystem would maintainapatterno fc o-occurrence of 'little change'. Through an information loop this blends with the synthesis of recent conceptualcontent by the propositional meanings ubsystem.
The dynamicsofattention to meaning are seen as having an especially critical role in depressive disorders. In the normal condition attention is assumed to shift smoothly and appropriately over time among the four different types of central representation and the five perceptual and effector representations. Theory suggests that control mechanisms generally workb ye valuating differenceso r discrepancies and invoking behaviours that might best resolve them. In the context of ahighly complex mechanism,attention may not always be focused on the 'right'i nformation. Errors of greater or lesser consequence pervade our everyday lives. For example, if asked the question' How many animals of each kind did Mosestake into the Ark?' mostofuswill answer 'two' without noticing that it was not Mosesinthis biblical story but Noah (Erickson &Mattson, 1981) . One possiblee xplanationo ft his kind of error is that attention is focused on propositional meaninga nd upon the questiono f' number' rather than upon the agent. Because Noah and Mosesconform to the same generic schematicmodelof 'bearded-old-testament-figure-with-two-syllable-name't he error is undetected by the generic, implicational processing of meaning.
Figure4enables us to define these different 'modes' of attending to meaning in amoresystematic way.InFigure 4a at the left of the tripartite diagram we see that the locuso fa ttention is directed at the image of recently generated propositional meanings: thisdenotes that the contents of the implicational image are outside focalawareness; the implicational component of the central engine is operating on something akin to automatic pilot; recently generated propositions would be 'analysed' in away which reproducedestablished implicational themes leading to the regeneration of the same schematicmodels.
In the central part of Figure 4b attention is again directed at propositional meanings,b ut this timei ts locusi sb etween thep ropositional and morphonolexical subsystems. Here, as in Figure 4a , implicational representations would be outside awareness. The outcome would again be the repeated generation of propositions with highly similar contents. In Figure4cattention is directed at implicational meanings. In this mode, any discrepancies in the content of schematicmodels relating to the current self-existential state would be in the focus of attention along with the affective markerst hat might accompany that content, such as negative feelings or an absence of positive ones.
These various configural possibilities allow us to develop hypotheses about rumination, about why patterns of interlocked thinking might be hard to break, and an alternative explanation of what is known as 'avoidance' in other theoretical frameworks. In verbal rumination it is hypothesized that therewould be apredominant pattern of mental reconfigurations topicalized on propositional processing (Figure 4a, b) . Avoidance would, for example, be captured by the idea that the focus of attention shifts only infrequently to the implicational image and is likely to dwell there for relatively brief durations in the face of potentially high affective charge and perhaps seemingly irresolvable discrepancies.
Using the 'language' of information processing theory, or the idea that implicational meanings have al atent quality, to explain what might underpin rumination and avoidant thinking are only of value if they lead to predictions that can be validated in laboratory research, translatei nto effective interventions or enable ab etter graspo ft he commonalities and differencesa cross diagnostic categories.I nr espect of thesei ssues our group has reported evidence from patients supporting the idea that schematicm odels do code generic themes and that the schematicmodels currently 'in place' do change in remission (Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst, &P aykel, 1 995) . There is also evidence that key cognitive features of depressed states such as overgeneral memoriesare positively correlatedw ith ruminative response styles and with relatively undifferentiated generic models of selfand others (Barnard, Watkins, &Ramponi, 2006; Ramponi, Barnard, &Nimmo-Smith, 2004) . We have studied extensively laboratory tasks analogous to the Moses error, in both normal subjectsa nd those with elevated levels of state anxiety and depression, to test the hypothesized shifts in attention between propositional and implicational meaning (Barnard, Scott, Taylor, May, & Knightley, 2004; Barnard, Ramponi, Battye, &Mackintosh, 2005) .
Translating macro-theory into coherent implications for clinicians presents challenges of ad ifferent kind (Barnard, 2004) . Most notably, Teasdale (1999) used this frameworkt op rovide at heoretical rationale for mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. In this case, translation into practice emphasized the development of strategies for controllinga nd shifting modes of attending to meaning in such aw ay as to reduce the likelihood of relapse during remission. Two trials have shownt his to be effective (Ma &T easdale, 2004) . Accordingt ot he theory,i nn ormali deation focusing attentiono n implicational image content brings into view the whole range of recently generated materialf rom bodily, externala nd conceptual origins. The ability to forge connections and links in this information space is seen as supportinga productive progression in thought content.H ence, the focusing of attention on implicational meanings and their content has been seen as ap ossible target for therapeutic intervention (see Teasdale, 1999; Teasdale &Barnard, 1993) . Other clinicians have drawn upon ICS macro-theory to define and evaluatec ognitive strategies for bringing about clinically useful change in both depression and psychosis (Bennet-Levey, 2003; Clark, 1999; Gumley &P ower, 2000; see Longmore &W orrell, 2007 for aw ider discussion). The common strand is that the key to change comes from facilitating the individual's use of adaptive, implicationally encoded, schematic models rather than simplytargeting changes in propositional thoughts per se.
In my opening discussion of different levels of systemsanalysis, Ipointed out that macro-theory requires as upporting body of empirically validated micro-theory. By itself macro-theory neither generates local predictions for laboratory research nor prescribes specifics trategies for clinical interventions. It has to be supportedb y additional assumptionsa nd evidence that require validation either in the laboratory or in clinical settings. What macro-theory offers is aguide about what to test and where to look for answers to key questions concerning clinical interventions. Teasdale (1982) proposed as et of questions that clinicians developing new interventions might wantt oc allu pon theory to help them answer. Table 1shows these, along with possible answers based on the position Ihave elaborated here.
The specific answers in the table summarize someofthe points Ihave already explained. No doubt they also reinforce our impressiont hat different traditions say similar things in different ways. However, the systematic nature of Teasdale's procedure throws up one important issue -r ates of change in implicational representations -w hich Ihave not yet discussed. The various strands of my basic evolutionarymacro-theoretic argument, and the obligation to translate them into viable clinical strategies that are open to empirical test, both bear upon the issue of why rate of change in implicational representations is aparticularly important variable.
From an evolutionaryp erspectivet here are persuasive arguments as to why we pay attention to changeso fs tate in the external environment and in our bodies, and why these can be associated with markerso fa ffect that provide information to discriminate which actions might be most adaptiveinaparticular context: insignificant or low rates of change are unlikely to attract attention; higher rates of change are likely to command it. Our earlier evolutionarysketch was based on the principle that the extra subsystems worki ne xactly the same way as their precursors. Therefore, attention to meaning shouldbegoverned by the same rateofchange parameter. It seems areasonable assumption that mental mechanismsh ave evolved to manage rates of change adaptively within ar ange that is neither too high nor too low. The interlocked state is marked by avery low rate of change in implicational image content. The rates of change in the specific propositions and ruminative verbalthoughts might be rather higher and as aresult attentionwould tend to focus on propositional meanings rather than implicational ones. This opens up the possibility that avoidant thinking may well be a developmentally acquired patternw ith no motivation other than an old means (in an evolutionarys ense)o fk eeping mental processing activity within an adaptive range.
It is generally acknowledged that the diagnostic categories applied to mental disorders are largely based upon descriptive criteria. They may not capture the essence of the underlying disorder of mental functioning. The macro-theoretical model Ihave set out also offers novel ways of understandingthe features of other mental disorders. For example, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders, anorexia nervosa and disorders across the schizophrenic and autistic spectra may each find an accounti nw hich different parameters governing central engine operation move outside their normal adaptiverange of functioning (Barnard, 2004; Park & Barnard, 2005) . These are the 'transdiagnostic' implications of macro-theories which may be useful tools in our efforts to identify the deeperp roblematics operating in mental disorders.
Conclusions
The extent to which thisform of macro-theory offers more than whatisalready offered by other theoretical accounts of specific conditions, such as major depression, remainst ob ed etermined. The approach captures the basis of dysfunctional thinking and affect in depressive episodes,a llowsu st oa ddress transdiagnostic concerns and to generate hypotheses to support the development of new interventions.Itdoesnot address the interpersonal origins of the condition, which would here be regarded as at arget for macro-theories of behaviour architecture,but ICS can be mapped to them (see Figure 1 ). Its characterization of latent meanings and avoidant thinking is undeniably mechanistic and 'de-personalized'. Criticsmight also argue that theories of such broad scope have too muchexplanatory power and tend to verge toward the intractable. Conversely, theories focused on narrow diagnostic categories lack the connective tissue needed to detect common mechanisms operating across diagnostic boundaries. Naturally, am atureb ody of macro-theory supported by well tried and tested micro-theories remains along way off. The framework of macro-theory outlined here and its instantiation in Interacting Cognitive Subsystems is perhaps best taken as acase study of whatitmight be to move more firmly in the direction of theories of broader scope.I tw ill have served its purpose here if it stimulates further debatearound these issues.
